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  A quarter century ago, there was a very influential paper that shaped thinking on how 
best to design what we now call the Internet. The article offered a design principle called “end-
to-end.” The idea was to keep the inner part of a computer network as simple as possible and 
allow the “intelligence” to reside at the edges of the network closer to the end user. 
 
  Proponents of this grand design have pushed for net neutrality legislation, which would 
discourage access providers from placing any intelligence in the inner part of the network. Their 
ideal of a “dumb network” would be achieved by preventing access providers from charging 
content providers for prioritized delivery and other quality enhancements made possible by 
placing intelligence at the center of the network. 
  
  This essay examines the merits of the end-to-end argument as it relates to the net 
neutrality debate. First, we review the evidence on the current status of the Internet, concluding 
that all bits of information are not treated equally from an economic standpoint. Second, we 
demonstrate that because consumers and business place a premium on speed and reliability for 
certain kinds of Internet services, network owners and specialized service providers have 
responded with customized offerings. Third, we consider our findings in the context of the 
current legislative proposals involving net neutrality. Fourth, we consider some of the problems 
with regulating prices and quality of service, which is essentially what the net neutrality 
proponents propose. Our principle conclusions are that the end-to-end principle does not make 
sense from an economic perspective and that further regulation of the Internet is not warranted at 
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     A quarter-century ago, three MIT computer scientists wrote a 
paper that shaped the thinking on how best to design what we now 
call the Internet, extolling a design principle dubbed “end to end.” 
The idea was to keep the inner part of a computer network as 
simple as possible and allow the “intelligence” – that is, the ability 
to prioritize one data packet over another – to reside at the edges of 
the network, closer to the end-user. 
Several leading Internet thinkers, including Larry Lessig of the 
Stanford University Law School, have suggested that end-to-end 
design has led to a huge amount of innovation in the ways the 
Internet is used. By treating all bits of data equally, entrepreneurs at 
the edges of the network can compete – or so the argument goes – 
to bring consumers new products and applications 
Many proponents of this grand design have pushed for “net-
neutrality” legislation, which would discourage Internet access 
providers from placing any intelligence in the inner part of the 
network. Their ideal of a “dumb” network would be achieved sim-
ply by preventing access providers from charging content providers 
for priority delivery or other quality enhancements, like guaranteed 
minimum bandwidth.
The net-neutrality debate is especially important today. Access 
providers are in the midst of a multibillion dollar campaign to 
upgrade their networks, using a mixture of capacity expansion 
and electronic enhancements to carry broadband content, includ-
ing multiple HDTV signals. Under net-neutrality regulation, they 
would be forced to meet this growing demand with increases in 
capacity only, which is a very costly solution for both access provid-
ers and their subscribers. And the prospects for such legislation 
have improved drastically because key Democratic supporters are 
back in leadership positions. 
Here, we review the evidence on the current status of the 
Internet, concluding that all bits of information are not treated 
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 Second, we show that because consumers 
and businesses place a premium on speed and 
reliability for certain Internet services, net-
work owners and specialized service provid-
ers have responded to market incentives with 
customized offerings. We think this is a good 
thing – not the initial step toward crony In-
ternet capitalism, as many net-neutrality ad-
vocates would argue. 
Third, we consider current Internet regu-
lation proposals, concluding that they are 
misguided and even extreme by the standards 
of those advocating net neutrality. In particu-
lar, the proposals would require access pro-
viders that offered enhanced quality to one 
content provider to make the same level of 
service quality available to all content provid-
ers at no extra charge.
 Fourth, we consider some of the problems 
with regulating prices and quality of service, 
which is essentially what the net-neutrality 
proponents want. Pricing ﬂ  exibility is a good 
thing in general, and there is no reason to be-
lieve that it is not a good thing here. In our 
view, the antitrust laws are adequate to police 
access providers who have incentives to dis-
criminate among content providers in the 
provision of service quality.
the myth that all bits are 
treated equal
The Internet is literally a network of comput-
ers. The network moves data to and from 
those computers. The network includes a set 
of routers – think of highway interchanges – 
connected by long wires. Packets of data get 
passed from one router to another, until they 
arrive at their destination. The packets travel 
at different speeds for different kinds of users, 
with the speed determined by a number of 
factors, including congestion on the network 
and bandwidth capacity at the point of con-
nection. Many users subscribe to services that 
allow them to use the Internet whenever they 
want at speciﬁ  ed maximum speeds. Thus, a 
typical consumer may pay $15 per month for 
a minimum speed of 786,000 bits per second 
and $30 for a minimum four times greater. 
The net-neutrality debate is largely about 
whether access providers have the right to give 
some data preferential treatment over other 
data – and then charge content providers for 
those preferences and for other enhanced 
services made possible by the technological 
ability to discriminate among data packets. 
Content providers could either pass a share of 
that surcharge for priority delivery on to their 
customers or use the enhanced capacity to 
generate revenue in myriad other ways – say, 
through advertising. 
The original proponents of the end-to-end 
principle argued that most features in the 
middle of a communications system are re-
dundant if the end-user must implement 
them a second time. This viewpoint leads to 
the model of a dumb network with intelli-
gence built only into its edges. According to 
Edward Felten, a Princeton University com-
puter science professor who is a proponent of 
the end-to-end principle, the routers in the 
middle of the Internet “forward packets with 
only minor processing – all the heavy lifting 
takes place on the transmitting and receiving 
computers.” Felten argues that keeping things 
this way makes sense in large part because 
computers at the edges of the network are 
owned and controlled directly by end-users.
This kind of design is not only more efﬁ  -
cient, argues Felten, but would also encourage 
innovation at the edges of the network. In 
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particular, Professors Lessig and Tim Wu of 
Columbia University Law School maintain 
that content providers will refrain from inno-
vation if access providers have the ability to 
discriminate against some of them.
This may sound reasonable on its face. But 
innovation among content providers does 
not appear to be slowing in spite of the lack of 
assurances that Lessig and company wish to 
legislate. The popularity of online search sys-
tems created by Yahoo and Google has given 
way to upstart social networks like MySpace 
and YouTube and movie-delivery sites like 
Vongo. In short, the Internet is not end-to-
end now and was never designed to be strictly 
neutral.
Most of the early writings on Transfer 
Communication Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) – the technical rules of the Internet 
– are contained in a series of informal papers 
known as Requests for Comments. These pa-
pers were not prepared by consultants on be-
half of commercial interests. Instead, they 
functioned much like fodder for a chat room, 
offering design concepts for the Internet and 
applications of computer networking. 
Interestingly, many of the contributors 
recognized the need to offer priority to some 
packets over others. A 1974 Request for Com-
ments, whose authors included Google’s cur-
rent chief technologist who is now a major 
proponent of net neutrality today, explained 
that outgoing packets should be given priori-
ty over other packets to prevent congestion 
on the ingoing and outgoing pipe. A 1981 Re-
quest for Comments explained that prece-
dence – a measure of importance of the data 
stream – could be used as a means of differ-
entiating high-priority trafﬁ  c from low-pri-
ority trafﬁ  c. And a 1994 Request for Com-
ments predicted that bandwidth constraints 
would eventually harm the delivery of real-
time applications (think of live voice commu-
nication), and suggested that an arrangement 
for some trafﬁ  c to receive preferred treatment 
was advisable. 
T he  Internet  is  not 
end-to-end  now  and  was 
never  designed  to  be 
strictly  neutral.32 The Milken Institute Review
These early writings on the Internet indi-
cate that prioritization has always been con-
sidered an important design characteristic for 
TCP/IP – a sharp contrast to the romantic 
ideal of the end-to-end principle.
Even if that principle had been applied 
faithfully in the early days of the Internet 
(which it was not), it is virtually irrelevant 
today. There are currently several ways that 
suppliers of information on the Internet 
manage to get selected content and applica-
tions to users faster and more reliably. For 
their part, end users can also buy services to 
improve speed and reliability. Access provid-
ers like AT&T, Verizon and Comcast can sup-
port quality-of-service (QoS) technology, 
which can give priority to speciﬁ  ed trafﬁ  c. 
The big access providers all compete by 
differentiating QoS. Other ﬁ  rms that are not 
access providers, including Akamai Technolo-
gies, CacheFly, Limelight Networks and Pan-
ther Express, offer similar services to content 
providers. Akamai, for example, provides 
content-acceleration service by caching con-
tent closer to the end-user for more than 
2,000 customers. There are also a large num-
ber of content providers, ranging from search 
engines like Google to businesses like eBay, 
that arrange to get their “products” to the 
market more quickly and reliably. Google sets 
up server farms packed with computers to 
store all of its content for end-users. Other 
ﬁ  rms are providing QoS for applications, like 
business-network alarm monitoring, that re-
quire a high degree of security.
By the same token, many applications de-
pend on QoS to perform well. Popular QoS-
needy applications include streaming multi-
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media, online gaming, voice-over-Internet 
protocol phone service, video teleconferenc-
ing, alarm signaling and safety-critical appli-
cations like remote surgery. 
Online gaming provides a good example 
of how and why all bits are not treated equal-
ly by access providers. If there is even a small 
delay in response time with some games or 
degradation in the quality of the video stream, 
product quality declines unacceptably. The 
suppliers of these games will frequently pay 
Web-hosting companies to offer faster and 
more reliable service than they could achieve 
with their own servers. They may pass the 
costs through to their customers. For exam-
ple, users pay between $13 and $15 a month 
to subscribe to the popular multiplayer on-
line role-playing game World of Warcraft, 
part of which presumably goes to maintain 
the quality of the gaming network.
bit equality and 
net-neutrality proposals
The net-neutrality bills before Congress rep-
resent an attempt to regulate the pricing of 
service quality by an access provider. But, as is 
demonstrated in virtually all other sectors of 
the economy, pricing ﬂ  exibility is generally a 
good thing.
Net-neutrality proponents nonetheless 
argue that Internet access providers – cable 
companies, phone companies, media con-
glomerates – wield too much power over con-
tent providers, and as a result, cannot be 
trusted to charge fairly for service quality. 
Without such price regulation, they say, ac-
cess providers might one day monopolize the 
content markets by charging excessive priori-
tization fees to outside content companies. 
Moreover, if upstart content providers are 
protected from the possibility of price goug-
ing, they will be encouraged to innovate faster 
than they do today. 
Net-neutrality proponents assert that reg-
ulation before the fact (as opposed to anti-
trust suits after the fact) is necessary because 
the harm from anticompetitive behavior (in 
terms of less innovation by content provid-
ers) could not be remedied appropriately by 
either injunctive relief or ﬁ  nes. This line of ar-
gument discounts the counterargument – 
namely, that there is a possibility that such 
regulation could generate harm that far out-
weighs the potential beneﬁ  ts.
The net-neutrality proposals would achieve 
their objective by imposing non-discrimina-
tion requirements on access providers in the 
provision of QoS to content providers. Non-
discrimination typically implies similar treat-
ment for similar types of customers. For ex-
ample, a non-discrimination rule for, say, a 
newspaper would require that a 2-inch-by-2-
inch advertisement cost the same for all ad-
vertisers, regardless of the nature of the ad or 
its placement. Non-discrimination has a su-
perﬁ  cial appeal, but it is not always consistent 
with economic efﬁ  ciency. Suppose that adver-
tiser A was willing to pay 10 times more than 
advertiser B for an advertisement, but the 
newspaper is constrained to charge both ad-
vertisers the same price. Economic theory 
suggests that the total beneﬁ  ts to buyers and 
sellers can be increased by raising advertiser 
A’s price while slightly lowering advertiser B’s 
price – much the way air travelers who book 
at the last minute pay more than vacationers 
who book months ahead.
Under each of the net-neutrality bills in 
Congress, however, non-discrimination in the 
pricing of service quality means something 
more extreme: if a broadband provider offers 
enhanced service to any individual content 
provider, it must offer the same enhance-
ments to all content providers at no extra 
charge. The idea is to stymie efforts by any 
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quality from access providers and instead to 
force all contracting for quality to occur be-
tween broadband providers and end-users. 
Note, by the way, that these bills generally 
do not distinguish between broadband ser-
vices offered by access providers and those 
offered by the companies that maintain the 
Internet “backbone,” and they would presum-
ably impose identical restrictions on both 
types of networks. Thus, because much of the 
enhanced QoS in the marketplace today re-
sides at the backbone layer, those offerings 
would presumably be in jeopardy.
One bill, for example, known as H.R. 5273, 
sponsored by Representative Ed Markey, a 
leading Democrat on telecom issues, explains 
in its preamble that “a network-neutrality 
policy based upon the principle of nondis-
crimination is essential to ensure that broad-
band telecommunications networks, includ-
ing the Internet, remain open to independent 
service and content providers.” The bill would 
require that an access provider “not discrimi-
nate in favor of itself in the allocation, use or 
quality of broadband services or interconnec-
tion with other broadband networks.” In other 
words, an access provider must offer the same 
service quality for its own content and unaf-
ﬁ  liated content. Finally, if an access provider 
offers a given service quality to one content 
provider, then it must offer the same service 
quality to all content providers free of charge.
Another bill, S. 2360, sponsored by Sena-
tor Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, would 
similarly prevent an access provider from dis-
criminating in the provision of QoS to con-
tent providers, and it would ban any charges 
for QoS. The bill would also prohibit an ac-
cess provider from discriminating with re-
spect to bandwidth. 
Requiring that service quality be priced at 
zero for content providers could have dra-
matic effects on existing contracts between 
access and content providers, as those content 
providers would presumably seek to renegoti-
ate their terms for service quality once the 
regulation had passed. Why should online 
gamers have to pay for QoS under existing 
contracts if everyone else is getting the same 
service quality free? 
first, do no harm
As the evidence on prices implies, the market 
for broadband access is highly competitive. 
Between 1999 and 2005, the price of a DSL 
connection by phone line (with a download 
speed of 1.5 megabits/second) has dropped 
from roughly $80 a month to about $30. 
While the absolute price of cable service has 
not declined as rapidly, the quality-adjusted 
price has declined signiﬁ  cantly, as cable con-
nection speeds have more than doubled while 
prices held steady. Where there remains insuf-
ﬁ  cient competition, the government’s existing 
antitrust authority is sufﬁ  cient to police an 
access provider’s behavior. If, for example, a 
provider with monopoly power offered high 
quality service to an online gaming provider 
but refused to sell the same level of service to 
an unafﬁ  liated  voice-over-Internet  protocol 
provider in order to protect its own subsid-
iary in the phone business, the antitrust laws 
would open the access provider to a lawsuit. 
But net neutrality would do more than 
gild the lily. Broadband access providers 
would likely react to non-discrimination pro-
visions in ways that would hardly serve the 
interests of content providers and content 
users. An access provider could comply with a 
non-discrimination provision either by with-
drawing its enhanced QoS offering from the 
marketplace or by replacing its tiered QoS of-
ferings with a one-size-ﬁ   ts-all QoS plan. 
Under either scenario, the total beneﬁ  ts to 
consumers would diminish. 
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To borrow another example from the air-
line industry, imagine a rule that required 
carriers to charge all customers the same 
price. One solution to this uniform pricing 
constraint would be for the airline to replace 
its ﬁ  rst class and economy seats with some 
blended offering inferior to ﬁ  rst but superior 
to economy. To preserve revenues, the airline 
would be forced to set the price of the blend-
ed offering above the price of the economy 
seat. Customers who would have preferred to 
pay a lower price and receive a smaller seat 
would clearly suffer under such a regime, as 
would people who were priced out of the 
market. Moreover, business and ﬁ  rst-class 
travelers who wanted better service and were 
willing to pay for it would have to settle for 
aching knees, pretzels instead of mixed nuts, 
and the occasional misbehaving child.
Entrepreneurs wishing to deliver content 
that depends critically on QoS would have no 
easy way to arrange it. Accordingly, they 
would likely divert their resources and cre-
ative energies to Internet uses that do not re-
quire high service quality. 
Consider the next generation of online 
video. Although today’s video clips may not 
require exceptional bandwidth or reliability, 
as online video is narrowcast in high-deﬁ  ni-
tion format and takes on a more interactive 
nature, it is not much of a stretch to envision 
the day when content providers will be sty-
mied by lack of resources. Thus, as a condi-
tion of investing resources into the develop-
ment of online video, companies like Apple, 
Google, Vongo and Sony need assurances that 
contracting for higher service quality with ac-
cess providers will be legal.
just say no
Although it may have represented a demo-
cratic ideal two decades ago, the end-to-end 
principle is a ﬁ   ction today and should be 
treated as such. Policymakers should look at 
how the Internet really functions from both a 
technical and an economic perspective. Mod-
ern networks are capable of acting more in-
telligently than earlier networks, which means 
that access providers now have the ability to 
prioritize data for those applications that de-
pend critically on it. If content providers are 
willing to pay for enhanced quality, there is 
no good reason for regulators to deter them. 
What will protect upstart content provid-
ers in the absence of net-neutrality regula-
tion? Two things: The ﬁ  rst, as noted earlier, is 
antitrust laws that deter access providers with 
demonstrated market power from abusing 
their positions. The second is a competitive 
environment in which the prospect of gaining 
market power over broadband access is re-
mote. Along with 25 other economists, from 
William Baumol to Alfred Kahn to Hal Vari-
an, we recently signed a statement calling for 
an end to local franchising regulations for 
broadband and the federal transfer of more 
wireless spectrum to private broadband uses 
(see www.aei-brookings.org/publications/ab-
stract.php?pid=1044). And, we would argue, 
it is here – and only here – that there is room 
for government regulation that is likely to do 
more good than harm. M
Although  it  may  have  represented  a  democratic 
ideal  two  decades  ago,  the  end-to-end  principle  is 
a  fiction  today  and  should  be  treated  as  such.